The development of the B-36 was triggered by Nazi Germany's aggression and subsequently by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Army Air Forces (AAF) required a long range bomber to carry the war to the enemy: Despite the sense of urgency, the B-36 program progressed slowly. Existing technology failed to satisfy the military requirements of 1941, early wartime demands exceeded materials, and weapons more readily available received the highest priority during the war.
Yet, the B-36 did survive in the postwar environment. The United States Air Force (established as an independent service in September 1947) needed a long range aircraft to carry the atomic bomb, and to further its claim on the atomic mission.
As the cold war intensified, deterrence through fear of atomic retaliation became the linchpin of American national security policy. Until air refuelable, jet powered bombers were operational, only the B-36, with its vast bombload capacity, could strike the Soviet Union, America's previous ally and now potential adversary. No matter the cost in effort or money, the B-36 had to be made to work. Just the same, the B-36 required technical innovations that were beyond the state of the art. The experimental flight of August 1946, nearly 6 years after signature of the development contract, confirmed that the new bomber was underpowered. Improvement of the original R-4360 engine yielded little relief, and Convair's attempts to fit the engine with a variable discharge turbine failed. In 1949, the engine problem was somewhat alleviated by mounting turbojets under each of the B-36's wings. Still, throughout its entire operational career, the B-36 heavy bomber remained too slow, a shortcoming that increased its vulnerability and necessitated the protection of escort fighters.
Until the B-52 Stratofortress became operational in the late 1950s, the B-36, as the only truly intercontinental bomber, was the mainstay of the Strategic Air Command. When General Curtis LeMay headed SAC (1949-57) and turned it into an effective nuclear delivery force, the B-36 formed the heart of his command. Its maximum payload was more than four times that of the B-29, even exceeding that of the B-52. The B-36 was slow and could not refuel in the air, but could fly missions to targets 3,400 miles (5,500 km) away and stay aloft as long as 50 hours. Moreover, the B-36 was believed to have an ace up its sleeve: a high cruising altitude, made possible by its huge wing area, that put it out of reach of all piston fighters and early jet interceptors.
Nevertheless, the B-36 was difficult to operate, prone in its early service years to catastrophic engine fires and other costly malfunctions. To its critics, these problems made it a "billion-dollar blunder". In particular, the United States Navy saw it as a costly bungle that diverted funding and interest from their pet project, aircraft carrier–based nuclear bombers. In 1947, the Navy attacked Congressional funding for the B-36, alleging that the aircraft failed to meet Pentagon requirements. The Navy believed that the dominance of the aircraft carrier in the Pacific during World War II proved that carrier-based air strikes would be decisive in future wars. To this end, the Navy designed the USS United States (CVA-58), a "supercarrier" capable of launching huge fleets of aircraft, or nuclear bombers. It then pushed to have funding transferred from the B-36 to the United States. The Air Force successfully defended the B-36 project, and the United States was officially cancelled by Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson.
Quoted Section from GlobalSecurity.org.
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